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This paper analyzes the impact of job insecurity perceptions on individual well-
being. In contrast to previous studies, we explicitly take into account perceptions
about both the likelihood and the potential costs of job loss and demonstrate that
most contributions to the literature su®er from simultaneity bias. When account-
ing for simultaneity, we ¯nd the true unbiased e®ect of perceived job insecurity
to be more than twice the size of naive estimates. Accordingly, perceived job in-
security ranks as one of the most important factors in employees' well-being and
can be even more harmful than actual job loss with subsequent unemployment.
Keywords: job security, life satisfaction, unemployment
JEL classi¯cations: D84, J63, Z13
11 Introduction
Perceived job insecurity has been a recurring theme in sociology, organizational
psychology and other ¯elds of the social sciences. While economists are accus-
tomed to focusing on objective labor market outcomes, such as wages or objective
unemployment risk, the analysis of entirely subjective concepts such as perceived
job insecurity can provide valuable insights. After all, one can argue that it is
individuals' perceptions of reality rather than objective features of reality that
determine individual behavior.
In economics, relatively few authors have taken this route of analysis, although
having said that, the perceived threat of job loss and unemployment is a corner-
stone in e±ciency wage theory (see, e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). One of the
earliest empirical contributions in the ¯eld is Blanch°ower (1991)1 who ¯nds a sig-
ni¯cant negative impact of perceived job insecurity on individual wages in the UK
during the 1980s. In his seminal analysis, perceived job insecurity is operational-
ized by subjective individual assessments of the likelihood of job loss. However,
it is important to bear in mind that in a wage- setting process, perceived job
loss risks are probably only one aspect. Perceptions about the associated costs
of losing a job, that depend, for instance, on forgone pay, chances of reemploy-
ment, social stigmas or other non-pecuniary e®ects arguably also alter a worker's
bargaining position.
An early study that describes the phenomenon of perceived job insecurity in
more detail is Dominitz and Manski (1997). Utilizing data from the Survey of Eco-
nomic Expectations, the authors operationalize perceived job insecurity by sub-
jective probabilities associated with job loss and ¯nd considerable heterogeneity
with respect to gender, race, and educational attainment. A related study based
on repeated cross-sections from the General Social Survey is Schmidt (1999), who
also operationalizes perceived job insecurity by subjective job loss probabilities,
however measured not continuously as in Dominitz and Manski (1997), but on a
four-point scale and provides evidence for a signi¯cant upwards trend in perceived
job insecurity between 1977 and 1996 from the General Social Survey.2 Further-
more, Schmidt (1999) and in a later study, Manski and Straub (2000), employ an
alternative subjective job insecurity measure relating to the perceived probability
that individuals attach to their chances of ¯nding a di®erent job that is similar
1See also Blanch°ower and Shadforth (2009) and Campbell, Carruth, Dickerson and Green (2007) for extended
and updated analyses.
2Other early economic studies operationalizing perceived job insecurity in a similar way include Bender and
Sloane (1999) on the impact of perceived job insecurity and union membership.
2in terms of pay and fringe bene¯ts. Thus, in some sense, this measure at least
partly captures the expected individual costs associated with job loss.
Following authors such as Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt (1984), Manski and
Straub (2000), Green, Felstead and Burchell (2000), and Nickell, Jones and Quin-
tini (2002), perceived job insecurity can be decomposed into at least two compo-
nents, one describing the perceived probability that the job will actually be lost
and one describing the individual costs associated with job loss. However, despite
such repeated e®orts to de¯ne perceived job insecurity in a more systematic way,
dozens of recent studies in economics as well as in other ¯elds of the social sciences
have continued to use the concept fairly arbitrarily.3 A strand of the literature
were this is most relevant and which we will consider in more detail in this paper
looks at the impact of perceived job insecurity on individual well-being.
Most contributions on the subject can be found in the organizational and so-
cial psychology literature, which dates back at least to Cobb and Kasl (1977),
who postulate that anticipation of unemployment is as harmful for individuals'
well-being, operationalized by a variety of physiological and psychological indi-
cators, as unemployment itself. Numerous studies have since related perceived
job insecurity to individual psychological and physical health as well as psycho-
logical well-being (see, e.g., Ferrie et al. 2004, De Witte 1999 and Sverke and
Hellgren 2002 for surveys of the literature). While unobserved individual hetero-
geneity is generally ignored in the psychological literature on the subject, which
makes causal inference di±cult, studies also vary starkly with respect to the oper-
ationalization of perceived job insecurity. Johnson, Messe and Crano (1984), for
instance, utilize information on subjective fears of job loss, thereby implicitly tak-
ing into account the subjective probability of the job loss event and the associated
expected costs. Other authors only use information on individual assessments of
the probability of becoming unemployed (e.g., De Witte 1999) or of losing their
job in the near future (e.g., Mohr 2000).
Building on this large body of empirical studies in the ¯eld of psychology, a
small literature on the subject is emerging in economics, however, accounting for
unobserved individual heterogeneity plaguing the aforementioned earlier contri-
butions.
A recent study by Luechinger, Stutzer and Meier (2010) indirectly identi¯es
the impact of perceived job insecurity on individual well-being by comparing the
3Recent examples of studies ignoring the subjective cost component of perceived job insecurity, only partly
due to data constraints, include Elman and O'Rand (2002), Scheve and Slaughter (2004), Benito (2006), Fullerton
and Wallace (2007), and Campbell et al. (2007).
3e®ects of state-level unemployment for employees in the private sector with pub-
lic sector employees who are more shielded from dismissals. While regional un-
employment arguably generates negative externalities a®ecting individuals' well-
being, the di®erent size of the e®ect for private and public employees suggests
that part of the negative well-being e®ects can be explained by individuals' dif-
ferent perceptions of economic security. Another recent study is Clark, Knabe
and RÄ atzel (2009) who revisit the social norm hypothesis as put forward by au-
thors such as Clark (2003) and Stutzer and Lalive (2004) and ¯nd that aggregate
unemployment has a less negative or even positive well-being e®ect for employed
respondents with directly measured high perceived job insecurity and for unem-
ployed respondents with poor subjective employment prospects. A related study
by Knabe and RÄ atzel (2009) evaluates the role of perceived job insecurity in indi-
vidual well-being in comparison to the e®ects of past unemployment experience.
While earlier studies (e.g., Clark et al. 2001) highlight the importance of past
unemployment experience for individuals' well-being even after becoming reem-
ployed, the authors argue that this e®ect operates through individual perceptions;
thus according to Knabe and RÄ atzel (2009), it is not past unemployment per se
that makes people unhappy but related perceptions about their job security.
While the aforementioned studies have greatly advanced our understanding of
the relevance of perceived job insecurity for individuals' well-being, it is regret-
table that they often lack a clear conceptualization of job insecurity perceptions.
In what follows, we will show that in the analysis of individual well-being the
correct operationalization of perceived job insecurity is essential to avoid omit-
ted variable and simultaneity bias. Section 2 introduces the concept of perceived
job insecurity in a slightly more formal way and discusses its measurement and
required data. Section 3 implements perceived job insecurity in a model of indi-
vidual well-being and discusses potential simultaneity bias. Section 4 applies a
new operationalization of perceived job security to individual data from a large
household panel survey and assesses the size of the endogeneity bias empirically.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Concept of Perceived Job Insecurity
Following authors such as Manski and Straub (2000), Green et al. (2000) and
Nickell et al. (2002), perceived job insecurity essentially consists of two elements:
the perceived probability of job loss and the subjective costs associated with job
4loss.
Accordingly, we denote perceived job security of individual i at time t most
generally as follows:
Fit = f (pit;(Uit ¡ U0
it)) (1)
with p denoting the subjective probability of job loss and (Uit¡U0
it) the expected
di®erence between utility with and without the present job with @Fit
@pit ¸ 0 and
@Fit
@(Uit¡U0
it) ¸ 0 and pit 2 [0;1].
Accordingly, the only assumptions we have made sofar are that perceived job
insecurity increases with the expected risk of job loss and the associated costs.
We further may assume that (Uit ¡ U0
it) 2 [0;1], i.e. an individual's utility in
the present job Uit is at least as high as or higher than expected utility outside
the present job U0
it. This seems plausible because if this assumption did not
hold, one would have to ask why an individual actually were in his or her present
job in the ¯rst place. However, it is also conceivable, at least temporarily, that
(Uit ¡ U0
it) < 0.
The size of the job loss cost component (Uit ¡ U0
it) depends on expected pe-
cuniary as well as non-pecuniary e®ects of job loss. Pecuniary e®ects occur due
to the di®erence between current job earnings and unemployment compensation
(see e.g., Nickell, Jones and Quintini, 2002) or through reduced earnings in a new
job. Other expected pecuniary e®ects may stem from, for example, foregone pre-
miums and pensions, loss of fringe bene¯ts, or the costs of moving or transport
to a potential new workplace.
Of course we would also expect substantial non-pecuniary e®ects. Numerous
studies have established that in terms of individual well-being, the non-pecuniary
e®ects of unemployment are in fact larger than the associated loss of income (see,
e.g., Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998). As argued by social psychologists such
as Jahoda (1981, 1988), these non-pecuniary e®ects of unemployment are due to
the associated loss of social contact outside the family, loss of purpose, status,
and identity and perhaps most controversially due to the loss of imposed time
structure. If the individual expects to experience some spell of unemployment
after job loss, it seems likely that some if not all of the associated non-pecuniary
e®ects are anticipated. After all, even if the individual does not expect to remain
unemployed after job loss we can speculate that she may expect to be deprived
of at least some of the latent functions of the current job.
A further assumption that seems logical is that if one of the perceived job
5security components is zero, perceived job insecurity would also be zero no matter
what value the other component takes on, that is, the two terms enter the function
in a multiplicative way. Thus, if the expected probability of job loss is zero, the
expected costs of job loss should not matter. At the same time, regardless of the
expected probability of job loss, if the utility levels inside and outside the present
job are identical there is no insecurity. Under this condition we can substantiate
perceived job security such that:





0 if pit = 0 or Uit = U0
it
R+ if pit 6= 0 and Uit > U0
it
(2)
At present there exist several individual-level surveys that provide the required
information for operationalizing perceived job insecurity. In the Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP),4 which we will utilize in what follows, respondents are asked to
answer the following question:
\What is your attitude towards the following areas { are you concerned
about them? - Your job security: very concerned, somewhat concerned,
not concerned."5
Similar information can be obtained, for instance, from the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS), the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Aus-
tralia Survey (HILDA)6 and the Russian Longitudinal Panel Survey (RLMS)7.
If Equation 2 is a good approximation of reality, we would expect individuals to
simultaneously evaluate their subjective risk of job loss pit as well as their asso-
ciated subjective costs of job loss (Uit ¡ U0
it) when revealing their concerns. We
will look into this in more detail by utilizing a number of other items from the
SOEP.
Starting from 1999 respondents have been asked biennially to state their ex-
pected pit:
\How likely is it that one or more of the following occupational changes
will take place in your life within the next two years? - lose your job?"
with answers lying on an equidistant eleven point scale ranging from 0 \de¯nitely
not" to 100 \de¯nitely." Figure 1 plots the distribution of p within the groups
of respondents that are \not concerned," \somewhat concerned," and \very con-
cerned" about their job security.
4For a detailed description of the data used in this study see Appendix A.
5The original German questionnaire asks: \Wie ist das mit den folgenden Gebieten - machen Sie sich da
Sorgen? - Um die Sicherheit Ihres Arbeitsplatzes? Gro¼e Sorgen, Einige Sorgen, Keine Sorgen."
6In the BHPS and HILDA, the question is phrased somewhat di®erently: \[...] how satis¯ed or dissatis¯ed
you are with [...] - Your job security."
7See Linz and Semykina (2008) for an application.





























































Expected job loss probablity p in %
Note: Author's calculations, based on unbalanced SOEP sample of 13,598 individuals.
What becomes clear is that perceived job insecurity is only loosely related to
the expected probability of job loss. About 60 percent of respondents who state
being \not concerned" about their job security have an expected job loss probabil-
ity of zero percent, which is reassuring. Furthermore, as one would expect, average
expected job loss probability is higher among the group of \somewhat concerned"
and further increases for the group of \very concerned." However, Figure 1 also
points to remarkable inconsistencies, since within the group of the \very con-
cerned" and the group of \somewhat concerned" the share of respondents with
an expected job loss probability of zero is 15 and 25 percent, respectively. Thus,
a signi¯cant proportion of respondents are concerned about job security but do
not expect at all to lose their job within the next two years.
One possible reason for such apparently inconsistent responses may be the
design of the questionnaire, which requires respondents to round o® their expected
job loss probabilities to zero or to full two digit percentage points (starting with
10 percentage points). According to Equation 2, high perceived job insecurity
would, however, be fully in line with any pit larger than zero, no matter how
small, if (Uit ¡ U0
it) is large. Another plausible explanation for such responses
may bet that perceptions of job insecurity stretch far into the future and, thus,
do not necessarily relate to immediately expected job loss risks. We test for this
hypothesis by relating expected job loss risk to two, four and six-year lagged
perceived job insecurity since, arguably, one can expect respondents who are very
7or somewhat concerned about their job security today to expect positive job loss
risks at some point in the future. However, the same inconsistencies were found
with our six-year lagged observations, suggesting, if anything at all, an even longer
time horizon of perceived job insecurity. Thus, the aforementioned assumption
of multiplicativity that led to Equation 2 does not appear to be borne out by
the data, and we cannot rule out that some individuals simply do not take their
expected job loss risk fully into account when evaluating their job insecurity.
Hence, there appears to be some economically unjusti¯ed component of perceived
job insecurity.
Accordingly, to account for the previously discussed inconsistencies and to
allow for a most general functional form of perceived job insecurity, we chose to
approximate Equation 1 by a polynomial in which pit and (Uit ¡ U0
it) enter mul-
tiplicatively as well as additively. Thus, as long (Uit ¡U0
it) > 0 our approximated
function explicitly allows for Fit > 0 even if pit = 0.
However, in our data, we do not observe the true values of Fit but as stated
earlier only observe perceived job insecurity on a three-point scale. Accordingly,
we can evaluate the predictive power of perceived job loss risk pit for perceived job
insecurity by estimating an ordered probit model (see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi
2005, Ch. 15).
Figure 2 depicts the actual shares of respondents who are \not concerned",
\somewhat concerned" and \very concerned" about their job security and corre-
sponding average predicted shares from a descriptive ordered probit model with
subjective job loss risk pit included as the only explanatory variable, but for
more generality captured non-parametrically by a full set of dummy variables
(see Column I of Table 1). As one may have expected, there is much room for
improvement upon the precision of our prediction of Fit.
According to our conceptualization, a model predicting Fit would ideally in-
clude measures of the second component of Equation 1, namely (Uit ¡ U0
it). The
¯rst variable in this expression Uit relates to the utility level in the current job
and could in principle be easily operationalized by information on current individ-
ual well-being. However, therein lies a problem, as numerous studies mentioned
earlier have already established that individual well-being in itself is a function
of perceived job insecurity (see, e.g., Ferrie et al. 2004, De Witte 1999, Sverke
and Hellgren 2002, Clark et al. 2009, Knabe and RÄ atzel 2009). Thus, following
our concept, perceived job insecurity and individual well-being are most likely
simultaneously determined.
8To improve on the overall predictive power of our descriptive model we there-
fore concentrate on the operationalization of the second term in (Uit ¡ U0
it), that
is, the expected out-of-job utility level. To capture this, we follow Schmidt (1999)
and Manski and Straub (2000) and take into account information on the perceived
chances of ¯nding an equivalent job if the present one is lost. In the SOEP, in-
dividual interviews contain the following question: \If you lost your job today,
would it be easy, di±cult, or almost impossible for you to ¯nd a new position
which is at least as good as your current one?." Thus, we have additional infor-
mation on the subjectively expected costs of job loss. Accordingly, our polynomial
approximation of Equation 1 now contains a full set of dummy variables for pit, a
full set of dummy variables capturing subjectively expected costs of job loss, and
a full set of interaction terms (see Column II of Table 1).
Figure 2 shows that after taking information on the expected costs of job
loss and associated interaction terms into account our average prediction of per-
ceived job security matches much more closely actual shares of \not concerned",
\somewhat concerned" and \very concerned" respondents. Clearly, one could
improve the model further by controlling more thoroughly for observed as well
as unobserved individual heterogeneity. However, for our descriptive analysis,
this should su±ce for demonstrating that there is indeed more to perceived job
insecurity than expected job loss risk.












































































Note: Author's calculations, based on unbalanced SOEP sample of 13,598 individuals.
9Table 1: Descriptive Ordered Probit Model
I II
p = 10% 0.3434 0.5973
(0.0184)*** (0.0454)***
p = 20% 0.6443 0.7803
(0.0180)*** (0.2506)***
p = 30% 0.9791 1.0617
(0.0207)*** (0.3286)***
p = 40% 1.2601 1.3624
(0.0288)*** (0.0817)***
p = 50% 1.4774 1.3513
(0.0185)*** (0.0521)***
p = 60% 1.6488 2.4507
(0.0462)*** (0.7374)***
p = 70% 1.7143 1.3044
(0.0435)*** (0.1273)***
p = 80% 1.7411 1.0783
(0.0456)*** (0.1402)***
p = 90% 1.5021 2.0523
(0.0607)*** (0.1383)***
p = 100% 1.7425 0.9642
(0.0391)*** (0.1043)***
p not reported 0.7691 0.8754
(0.0704)*** (0.1941)***







Full set of interaction terms F=274.74***
Threshold 1 0.2877 0.7590
(0.0100)*** (0.0229)***




Note: Standard errors in parentheses, ***, **, * statistically signi¯cant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Default categories: p = 10%, Chance of ¯nding equivalent job - easy. Sample of employed respondents.
103 Simultaneity
As mentioned earlier, numerous studies have proclaimed a causal link between
perceived job insecurity and individual well-being (see, e.g., Ferrie et al. 2004,
De Witte 1999, Sverke and Hellgren 2002, Clark et al. 2009, Knabe and RÄ atzel
2009).
However, if our conceptualization of perceived job security is correct we would
expect perceived job insecurity and individual well-being to be simultaneously
determined. Accordingly, parameter estimates that do not take simultaneity into
account would be biased. We can derive this more formally and also form an
expectation about the theoretical direction of the bias. Later we will present an
application that tests for simultaneity and empirically quanti¯es the associated
bias.
Let us start with the hypothesis that indeed perceived job insecurity and
individual well-being are simultaneously determined. Accordingly we can write
that:
Fit = f (pit;(Uit ¡ U0
it)) (3)
¼ ® + ¯UUit + ¯U0U0
it + ¯ppit + ¹it
and
Uit = z(Fit;Xit) (4)
¼ ° + ±Fit + µXit + ²it
with F and U denoting perceived job insecurity and subjective well-being and X
representing any socio-economic control variables for individual i at time t.
Applying a bit of algebra we can derive an expression for the size and direction










with ¯U± 6= 1.
As suggested by, for example, Ferrie, Shipleya, Newman, Stansfeld and Mar-
11mot (2005), De Witte (1999), Sverke and Hellgren (2002), Clark et al. (2009) and
Knabe and RÄ atzel (2009) and in concordance with common sense, we obtain that
± < 0, that is, perceived job insecurity lowers individual well-being. Furthermore,
according to our conceptualization of perceived job insecurity in Equation 1 we
have ¯U > 0. Thus, we can derive that bias ¸ 0, that is, if perceived job insecurity
and individual well-being are indeed simultaneously determined, the coe±cient of
perceived job insecurity will be upward-biased in any model assessing individual
well-being and operationalizing perceived job insecurity by information on job
loss concerns (as in, e.g., Johnson et al. 1984, Clark et al. 2009, Knabe and
RÄ atzel 2009).
Needless to say, if instead perceived job insecurity is operationalized by ex-
pected job loss risk only (as in, e.g., Mohr 2000) coe±cients would also probably
be biased since expected job loss risk is only one component of perceived job
insecurity, as demonstrated in Section 2. The direction of bias would, however,
depend on the covariance between pit and (Uit ¡ U0
it); if it is positive then disre-
garding (Uit ¡ U0
it) also yields upward-biased coe±cients.
In other words, if our conceptualization of perceived job insecurity is indeed
plausible then the e®ect of perceived job insecurity on individual well-being has
been systematically underestimated in the previously discussed literature.
4 Application: The Size of the Bias
In the next section, we apply our concept of perceived job insecurity to concrete
data from the SOEP and quantify the previously discussed potential endogeneity
bias in a model of individual well-being. A detailed description of the data as
well as summary statistics are provided in Appendix A. We want to estimate
the relationship sketched out in Equation 4 accounting for individual observed
and unobserved heterogeneity and take the potential simultaneity problem into
account.
We specify following empirical model with fairly standard control variables






+ ¯semp sempit + ¯olf olfit
+ ½ unempratert
+ °AGEit + ±KIDSit + ´HEALTHit + # ln(hhincomeit)
+ Á empit £ Fit + ¿t + ¹i + ²irt (6)
with i denoting the individual, r federal state, and t time. U is individual
well-being and uemp, semp, and olf are dummy variables that take the value one
if the individual in time t is unemployed, self-employed, or out of the labor force.
Being employed (emp) is the default category. Following authors such as Clark
(2003), we also take into account the duration of unemployment to separate the
e®ects of very recent unemployment (d = D :< 2 months), recent unemployment
(d = D : 2 ¡ 5 months), medium-term (d = D : 5 ¡ 11 months), long-term
(d = D : 12¡35 months), and permanent (d = D :> 35 months) unemployment.
Following the literature (e.g., Kassenboehmer and Haisken DeNew 2009) we
also control for the federal-state level unemployment rate (unemprate).8 AGE is
a vector of dummy variables for respondents falling into the age intervals [25,35),
[35,45), [45,55), and [55,64], with [18,25) being the default category.9 The vector
KIDS contains the number of children in the household and the number of chil-
dren squared, both, if applicable, interacted with gender. HEALTH captures
the \objective" health status of the individual and contains the number of annual
doctor visits and the number of doctor visits squared. The variable hhincome
denotes the equivalence scale post-government household income in real prices
from 2001.10
Perceived job insecurity enters the model through the interaction term
emp £ F, since our sample consists of employed, unemployed, and self-employed
respondents as well as individuals out of the labor force, and perceived job inse-
8We do not, however, interact regional unemployment rates by labor force status since the analysis of social
norm e®ects as in, e.g., Stutzer and Lalive (2004) is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Furthermore, note
that combining aggregate level and micro-level data could give rise to contemporaneous correlation and result
in biased standard errors of the regional unemployment variable (see Moulton, 1986). Unfortunately, applying
sandwich-type formulas for clustered standard errors is not an option in the present analysis, since the number
of clusters is too small (16 federal states).
9Note that in our ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation with year dummies continuous age controls would result in perfect
collinearity. Age interval dummies are identi¯ed through switches between categories.
10Applying the equivalence scale is essential to separate the life satisfaction e®ects of children and household
income. To calculate the equivalent scale household income, we simply divide household income by the squared
sum of household members. The analysis is, however, robust to more elaborate methods. Furthermore, we do not
include measures of relative income in our model as this is beyond the scope of the analysis.
13curity at any given time is naturally only observed for employees. F consists of a
dummy variable for individuals who are very concerned about their job security
(F : very concerned) and a dummy variable for individuals who are somewhat
concerned (F : somewhat concerned) with unconcerned individuals constituting
the default category. The error term is decomposed into time-speci¯c e®ects ¿t
and individual ¯xed e®ects ¹i. The remaining error term ²it is allowed to be
heteroscedastic, and according to our reasoning in Section 3, is expected to be
correlated with F due to simultaneity.
As is common in such analyses we cannot directly observe individual life sat-
isfaction. In the individual questionnaires of the SOEP, individuals are asked
to state their current life satisfaction: \How satis¯ed are you with your life, all
things considered?" ranging from 0 \completely dissatis¯ed" to 10 \completely
satis¯ed" on an equidistant eleven-point scale. Accordingly, the obvious choice
would be to estimate Equation 6 by a latent model similar to the one employed
in the descriptive analysis presented in Section 2. However, as demonstrated in
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), disregarding unobserved individual hetero-
geneity would result in severely biased coe±cients.
Instead, we follow authors such as Luechinger (2009), Stevenson and Wolfers
(2008), Clark et al. (2009), and Knabe and RÄ atzel (2009) and utilize the \Probit-
Adapted OLS" framework by Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008), who
suggest representing ordinal life satisfaction responses as normally distributed
bounded responses on a cardinal scale. The approach has the main advantage
that once the transformation has been carried out, responses are bounded and
simple linear models can be employed. Thus, it is straightforward to control
for unobserved heterogeneity by including individual ¯xed e®ects and also to
undertake instrumental variable regression. While such transformation is more
restrictive than, for example, the extended conditional logit methodology pro-
posed by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), the authors also demonstrate
that their extended conditional logit estimates are generally fairly similar even
to the ones of simple linear models as long as unobserved individual heterogene-
ity is accounted for (See also Frey and Stutzer 2000). To check the robustness
of our ¯ndings from probit-adapted OLS we also estimate all models by simple
within-transformed OLS (see Appendix B).
To test and account for potential simultaneity bias outlined in Section 3 we
need excluded instruments that have su±cient predictive power for reported per-
ceived job insecurity F and are orthogonal to the error term ²it in Equation 6.
14Importantly, as already discussed in Section 2, we do not observe perceived job
insecurity on a cardinal but only on an ordinal scale. Accordingly, we capture and
subsequently instrument perceived job insecurity falling into the categories \not
concerned", \somewhat concerned" and \very concerned" by a set of dummy
variables with the category \not concerned" as the default. Thus, we have to
instrument for two variables simultaneously.
Following the discussion in Section 2, variables that capture individuals' per-
ceptions of job loss risk and their perceived chances of ¯nding an equivalent job
seem to be promising candidates as valid instruments. Accounting for unob-
served individual heterogeneity by a ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation, in a \¯rst stage"
we regress our dummy variables for F on all included and excluded instruments
and test for the predictive power of our excluded instruments.11 Accordingly,
our initial model includes all explanatory variables from Column II in Table 1
in Section 2. Perceived job loss risk captured by a set of 11 dummy variables
representing perceived job loss probability ranging from p=10% to p=100%, with
p=0% being the default category and one dummy capturing item non-response.
Furthermore, we include dummy variables for individuals whose perceptions about
their chances of ¯nding an equivalent job fall in the category \almost impossi-
ble", \di±cult", and a dummy variable for individuals who give no response to
this question, \easy" constitutes the default category. In addition we include a
full set of interaction terms between the dummy variables for p and chances of
¯nding an equivalent job.
Including all variables and interaction terms our initial GMM model uses 46
orthogonality restrictions. This is problematic since several studies summarized
in Chapter 8.6. of Wooldridge (2002) highlight the poor ¯nite sample properties
of GMM estimators with many overidentifying restriction. We therefore also
estimate GMM models with a drastically reduced set of excluded instruments.
Table 2 reports instrument validity tests for the \¯rst stage" polynomial model
speci¯cation with 46 orthogonality restrictions and for the reduced one. First of
all, as the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic indicates, we can clearly reject under-
identi¯cation for the reduced as well as for the polynomial speci¯cation.12 In
addition, we can clearly reject weak identi¯cation for the reduced speci¯cation,
since the F statistic is far above the critical values reported in Stock and Yogo
11A non-linear \¯rst stage" model is not required since Kelejian (1971) and Heckman (1978) show that a simple
linear probability model is su±cient to obtain consistent estimates in the \second-stage regression."
12The Kleibergen-Paap rank LM test is a heteroscedasticity-robust variant of the Anderson canonical correlation
test. See Paap (2006) for further details.
15(2005). However, for the polynomial speci¯cation we cannot reject weak identi-
¯cation for the male sample casting doubt on the explanatory power of at least
some of the 46 excluded instruments.13 Thus, we prefer the model speci¯cations
with a reduced number of overidentifying restrictions.
We proceed by testing the orthogonality of our excluded instruments and the
error term in the \second stage." As indicated by the Hansen J-Statistics reported
in Table 2, we cannot reject orthogonality in any case. Accordingly, our excluded
instruments are valid and we can test whether the potential endogeneity bias
outlined in Section 3 indeed materializes.14
Table 2 presents C-tests of exogeneity of the included dummy variables for
perceived job insecurity. As indicated by the high Hansen J-Statistics, we can
con¯dently reject exogeneity for all samples. Hence, the previously discussed en-
dogeneity bias is indeed relevant. Not accounting for the simultaneity of perceived
job insecurity and individual well-being results in biased coe±cients.
We can quantify the size of the bias by comparing a restricted but e±cient
¯xed e®ects model that assumes exogeneity of F with a consistent model that
allows for endogeneity by instrumenting for F. In the light of the discussed poor
¯nite sample properties of GMM models with a large number of orthogonality
conditions we do so by utilizing the GMM model with a reduced number of
orthogonality conditions reported in the second half of Table 2.15
Table 3 presents respective coe±cient estimates for the whole sample and for
completeness by gender for the restricted e±cient as well as the consistent model.
Regarding our standard control variables, our coe±cients are in line with earlier
empirical studies although many coe±cients are not identi¯ed with su±cient pre-
cision. This may not be surprising, however, as we control for ¯xed individual as
well as time e®ects.
Regarding perceived job insecurity, which we are most interested in, we ¯nd
a negative and statistically signi¯cant e®ect on individual well-being in all model
speci¯cations with some small di®erences between genders. However, most im-
portantly, in line with our expectation sketched out in Section 3, we ¯nd the coef-
¯cients of perceived job insecurity to be signi¯cantly upward biased in the simple
13We employ heteroscedasticity robust GMM estimations. All estimations and corresponding tests are carried
out using the Stata add-ons \ivreg2" and \xtivreg2" provided by Baum, Scha®er, Stillman (2003, 2007).
14At ¯rst glance it may seem problematic to use perceived job loss probabilities as excluded instruments since
one clearly would expect them to a®ect individuals life satisfaction. However, once we condition on perceived job
insecurity, subjective job loss probabilities carry no additional explanatory power. At the same time the sceptical
reader may worry about unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the excluded instruments and which
also determine individual life satisfaction, i.e. a violation of the orthogonality condition. However, individual
¯xed e®ects control for this problem, at least as long unobserved characteristics do not change over time.
15We also report results for GMM models with full polynomial speci¯cation of the \¯rst stage" in Appendix B.
16Table 2: Validity of Instruments and Exogeneity Tests
All Males Females
Full Polynomial \First Stage"
Excluded instruments: 11 dummies for p = 10,...,p = 100, p = not reported, (p = 0 default)
3 dummies for chance of ¯nding equivalent job: di±cult, impossible, not-reported
(easy default); interaction terms
Underidenti¯cation
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic Chi2 = 1318:36 Chi2 = 646:27 Chi2 = 648:80
p = 0:00 p = 0:00 p = 0:00
Weak Identi¯cation
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic F = 35:42 F = 17:89 F = 45:23
Stock-Yogo critical value for 5% relative IV bias - 21.02
Overidentifying Restrictions (Orthogonality)
Hansen J-Statistic Chi2 = 48:12 Chi2 = 44:60 Chi2 = 36:35
p = 0:32 p = 0:40 p = 0:75
Exogeneity C-Test Chi2 = 88:52 Chi2 = 86:91 Chi2 = 18:32
p = 0:00 p = 0:00 p = 0:00
Simpli¯ed \First Stage"
Excluded instruments: 2 dummies for p <= 20 , p >= 80
2 dummies for chance of ¯nding equivalent job: impossible, not-reported
Underidenti¯cation
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic Chi2 = 564:06 Chi2 = 259:43 Chi2 = 314:27
p = 0:00 p = 0:00 p = 0:00
Weak Identi¯cation
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic F = 158:76 F = 73:10 F = 88:37
Stock-Yogo critical value for 5% relative IV bias - 11.04
Overidentifying Restrictions (Orthogonality)
Hansen J-Statistic Chi2 = 2:68 Chi2 = 2:95 Chi2 = 2:39
p = 0:26 p = 0:23 p = 0:30
Exogeneity C-Test Chi2 = 91:84 Chi2 = 85:10 Chi2 = 20:37
p = 0:00 p = 0:00 p = 0:00
restricted model that ignores simultaneity between perceptions of job insecurity
and individual well-being. We can illustrate the size of the bias by calculating
the compensating income di®erential as is commonly done in the literature (e.g.,
Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998, KassenbÄ ohmer and Haisken DeNew 2009).
Thus, we can ask by how much individuals' income had to be raised to compensate
them for the negative well-being e®ects of perceived job insecurity.
Using the point estimates from the biased model reported in Column I
of Table 3, the compensating income di®erential of becoming somewhat con-
cerned relative to being not concerned about job security is 1.4 log points
(¢ln(hhincome) = 0:1091=0:0781) while for the very concerned it is 3.3 log
points (¢ln(hhincome) = 0:2603=0:0781). When relying instead on the un-
biased point estimates from Column II of Table 3, we ¯nd the compensat-
17ing income di®erential to be 3.9 (¢ln(hhincome) = 0:2911=0:075) and 8.5
(¢ln(hhincome) = 0:6367=0:075) log points for somewhat and very concerned
respondents, respectively.
Similarly, when using the point estimates from the naively estimated model
for the male sub-sample (see Column III in Table 3) we ¯nd the compensating
income di®erential to be 1.6 log points for somewhat concerned and 3.6 log points
for very concerned males. When accounting for simultaneity, the compensat-
ing income di®erential is 4.4 and 10 log points respectively (see Column IV in
Table 3). When looking at the model for the female sub-sample, our naively esti-
mated coe±cients imply a compensating income di®erential of 1.2 log points for
somewhat concerned and 3 log points for very concerned female respondents. The
endogeneity consistent GMM model implies a compensating income di®erential
of 2.9 log points for somewhat concerned and 6.6 log points for very concerned
females (see Columns V and VI in Table 3).
Thus, while there is some variation in the magnitude of the negative well-being
e®ects of perceived job insecurity across gender, with males being most adversely
a®ected, we generally ¯nd the true unbiased e®ect of perceived job insecurity
to be more than twice the size of the naively estimated e®ects. Accordingly
and in line with our theoretical prediction in Section 3, ignoring simultaneity
between perceived job insecurity and individual well-being as is commonly done
in the literature (e.g., Ferrie et al. 2004, De Witte 1999, Sverke and Hellgren
2002; Clark et al. 2009, Knabe and RÄ atzel, 2009) drastically underestimates the
negative impact of job insecurity perceptions.
It is informative to put the size of the e®ects of perceived job insecurity in
perspective by comparing compensating income di®erentials of other individual
characteristics. For instance, using the regression results for the pooled sample
from Column II in Table 3, the positive well-being e®ect of having a steady
partner can only compensate for less than a quarter of the negative well-being
e®ect of being very concerned about job security. Also, our estimates indicate
that the negative well-being e®ect of being very concerned about job security,
ceteris paribus, is more than eighteen times higher than the positive well-being
e®ect women experience after their ¯rst child is born. Furthermore, being very
concerned about job security has similar well-being e®ects to having fairly bad
health as approximated by an equivalent number of 177 doctor visits per year.
Accordingly, we can establish that perceived job insecurity is indeed one of the
major determinants of employees' well-being.
18In addition, perceived job insecurity also has implications for evaluating the
well-being costs of unemployment and other labor force statuses. According to
Table 3, recent and medium-term unemployment appears to signi¯cantly lower in-
dividual well-being compared to employed individuals in all model speci¯cations.
However, for correct interpretation it is essential to also consider the coe±cients
on all employment interaction terms when comparing individual well-being be-
tween di®erent labor force statuses. In our model, being employed emp is the
default category; accordingly we can substitute emp = 1¡uemp¡semp¡olf in
Equation 6. It now becomes clear that when comparing individual well-being of,




D:<2 months ¡ Uemp = ¯D:<2 months ¡ ÁF; (7)
that is, one has to take perceived job insecurity of those in employment into
account.
On this basis we can calculate the compensating income di®erential, that is,
the hypothetical income increase that holds individuals well-being constant once
they become unemployed. Using the point estimates from the pooled regres-
sion (Column II in Table 3), we calculate a compensating income di®erential
of 7 log points ¢ln(hhincome) = (0:5247)=0:075) for recently unemployed in-
dividuals who were not concerned about their job security during employment.
For the recent unemployed who were somewhat concerned about their job se-
curity when employed, the compensation income di®erential is 3.1 log points
(¢ln(hhincome) = (0:5247 ¡ 0:2911)=0:075).
This clearly con¯rms earlier ¯ndings of, for example, Winkelmann and Winkel-
mann (1998) and points to a very large non-pecuniary component in the well-being
e®ect of unemployment (see, e.g., Jahoda 1981, 1986 for explanations).
However, our estimates also indicate that for recently unemployed individ-
uals who were very concerned about their job security when employed, this
compensating income di®erential actually becomes negative (¢ln(hhincome) =
(0:5247 ¡ 0:6367)=0:075 = ¡1:5 log points). Hence, this group of respondents
actually becomes better o® when their feared job loss eventually materializes.
Thus, for respondents who are very concerned about their job security, the
negative well-being e®ects of job loss concerns are even larger than the well-
being loss associated with recent unemployment. Accordingly, we can con¯rm a
hypothesis put forward in the psychological literature (e.g., Cobb and Kasl 1977)
19and postulate that the fear of job loss may indeed be more damaging for individual
well-being than actual job loss and unemployment.
Table 3: Regression Results - Probit-Adapted Linear Fixed E®ects Model
All Male Female
I - FE II - FE GMM III - FE IV - FE GMM V - FE VI - FE GMM
Age : 25 ¡ 34 -0.0146 -0.0194 -0.037 -0.0523 -0.0047 -0.0064
[0.0205] [0.0208] [0.0310] [0.0316]* [0.0275] [0.0276]
Age : 35 ¡ 44 -0.0269 -0.0286 -0.064 -0.0769 -0.0038 -0.0031
[0.0277] [0.0281] [0.0409] [0.0420]* [0.0378] [0.0380]
Age : 45 ¡ 54 -0.0528 -0.0492 -0.1163 -0.12 -0.0083 -0.0051
[0.0340] [0.0343] [0.0496]** [0.0508]** [0.0468] [0.0469]
Age : 55 ¡ 64 -0.0673 -0.0748 -0.1059 -0.1239 -0.0448 -0.049
[0.0415] [0.0418]* [0.0601]* [0.0613]** [0.0573] [0.0576]
Number Children £ Male 0.0318 0.0285 0.029 0.0245
[0.0184]* [0.0185] [0.0186] [0.0190]
Number Children2 £ Male -0.0099 -0.0088 -0.0095 -0.0079
[0.0058]* [0.0059] [0.0058] [0.0060]
Number Children £ Female 0.0401 0.0414 0.0381 0.038
[0.0176]** [0.0177]** [0.0178]** [0.0179]**
Number Children2 £ Female -0.0078 -0.0077 -0.0073 -0.0071
[0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0051]
Steady Partner £ Male 0.1391 0.1438 0.1397 0.1457
[0.0247]*** [0.0249]*** [0.0250]*** [0.0254]***
SteadyPartner £ Female 0.1697 0.1706 0.1665 0.1666
[0.0228]*** [0.0229]*** [0.0229]*** [0.0230]***
ISCED : UNI 0.0171 0.002 -0.0741 -0.1158 0.0904 0.0888
[0.0369] [0.0372] [0.0535] [0.0545]** [0.0512]* [0.0514]*
ISCED : HigherSecondary -0.0321 -0.0338 -0.092 -0.1013 0.0176 0.0189
[0.0181]* [0.0182]* [0.0260]*** [0.0264]*** [0.0252] [0.0253]
ISCED : notreported -0.0152 -0.019 -0.0061 -0.0094 -0.0233 -0.028
[0.0371] [0.0373] [0.0549] [0.0550] [0.0504] [0.0506]
Number of doctor visits -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0042 -0.0041 -0.0031 -0.0031
[0.0003]*** [0.0003]*** [0.0004]*** [0.0004]*** [0.0004]*** [0.0004]***
ln(EquivalentIncome) 0.0781 0.075 0.0829 0.0809 0.0749 0.0721
[0.0112]*** [0.0113]*** [0.0178]*** [0.0180]*** [0.0145]*** [0.0145]***
uemp ¤ D :< 2 months -0.3612 -0.5247 -0.4786 -0.71 -0.2532 -0.3543
[0.0254]*** [0.0377]*** [0.0360]*** [0.0567]*** [0.0358]*** [0.0504]***
uemp ¤ D : 2 ¡ 5 months -0.4625 -0.634 -0.588 -0.8248 -0.3131 -0.4208
[0.0448]*** [0.0541]*** [0.0567]*** [0.0731]*** [0.0717]*** [0.0824]***
uemp ¤ D : 6 ¡ 12 months -0.4218 -0.5982 -0.4959 -0.7489 -0.3495 -0.455
[0.0412]*** [0.0507]*** [0.0535]*** [0.0716]*** [0.0641]*** [0.0735]***
uemp ¤ D : 12 ¡ 35 months -0.4633 -0.6465 -0.5667 -0.8287 -0.3672 -0.4796
[0.0255]*** [0.0384]*** [0.0358]*** [0.0573]*** [0.0365]*** [0.0520]***
uemp ¤ D :¸ 36 months -0.4203 -0.6135 -0.555 -0.8307 -0.2949 -0.4145
[0.0364]*** [0.0470]*** [0.0507]*** [0.0689]*** [0.0525]*** [0.0649]***
outlf -0.1572 -0.3063 -0.2296 -0.4442 -0.1092 -0.2026
[0.0136]*** [0.0294]*** [0.0226]*** [0.0463]*** [0.0175]*** [0.0382]***
semp 0.0341 0.0235 0.0224 0.0038 0.0409 0.0346
[0.0247] [0.0248] [0.0340] [0.0340] [0.0358] [0.0361]
regional unemployment -0.0048 -0.0032 -0.004 -0.0008 -0.0053 -0.0046
[0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0046] [0.0047] [0.0043] [0.0043]
F : somewhat concerned -0.1091 -0.2911 -0.1305 -0.3564 -0.0879 -0.2061
[0.0102]*** [0.0618]*** [0.0137]*** [0.0930]*** [0.0153]*** [0.0818]**
F : very concerned -0.2603 -0.6367 -0.2984 -0.8168 -0.2248 -0.4775
[0.0152]*** [0.0452]*** [0.0205]*** [0.0629]*** [0.0226]*** [0.0655]***
Observations 68622 68622 32623 32623 35999 35999
R2 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.97
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * - statistically signi¯cant at 1, 5, 10%.
All speci¯cations contain a full set of year dummies and are within transformed.
Default categories: Age : 18 ¡ 24, ISCED : lower secondary or less, emp, F : not concerned
205 Conclusion
The present paper assesses the importance of job insecurity perceptions as a de-
terminant of individual well-being. In Contrast to previous studies, our concept
of perceived job insecurity explicitly takes into account individual perceptions
about the likelihood of job loss as well as perceptions about the associated costs
of job loss. We demonstrate that both job loss risk and cost perceptions consti-
tute essential components of individual perceived job insecurity. Consequently,
we theoretically demonstrate that through the associated cost component of job
loss, any model assessing the impact of perceived job insecurity on individual
well-being potentially su®ers from simultaneity bias resulting in upward-biased
coe±cients. To the present date, the economics literature as well as other ¯elds
of the social sciences have ignored this problem and have thereby systematically
underestimated the impact of job insecurity perceptions.
To illustrate the size of the simultaneity bias, we apply our concept of perceived
job insecurity to a model of individual well-being using a large household panel
survey and circumventing endogeneity by instrumenting. In our application, we
¯nd the true unbiased e®ects of perceived job insecurity to be more than twice
the size of estimates that ignore simultaneity. Thus, simultaneity bias is not only
a theoretical concern but is also very relevant empirically.
In comparison to other determinants, our results suggest that perceived job
insecurity ranks as one of the most important factors for employees' well-being.
Furthermore, our estimates indicate that while recent experience of unemploy-
ment is associated with substantial well-being losses, this is only true in compari-
son to employed individuals who are not or only somewhat concerned about their
job security. For individuals who are very concerned about their job security, we
have the paradoxical situation that when the event of job loss they fear eventu-
ally materializes, their well-being actually increases. Thus, for some individuals,
the fear of job loss is more harmful to their well-being than actual job loss with
subsequent unemployment.
Why does this matter? First of all, from a subjectivist viewpoint, our ¯nd-
ings about the well-being e®ects of perceived job insecurity are interesting and
relevant in their own right, as they concern welfare (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer
2002b for a discussion). Second, our ¯ndings of the well-being implications of
perceived job insecurity can contribute to a better understanding of individual
job search activities. Do individuals who experience substantial well-being losses
from perceived job insecurity expand their job search activities while in employ-
21ment? How are job search activities a®ected by the aforementioned paradoxical
situation that individuals who were very concerned about their job security are
actually better o® once they become unemployed? These are important questions
for future research.
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A Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our individual-level data is from the 2008 release of the Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a representative longitudinal survey of private
households in Germany that has been continuously running since 1984.16
16Recent studies on the basis of the SOEP include Kassenboehmer and DeNew (2009) and Luechinger et al.
(2010). A detailed description of the SOEP is provided in Wagner, Frick and Schupp (2007). The data was
extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz for Stata. PanelWhiz (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) was written
27We utilize all samples and make no exclusions with respect to foreigner
status or former East and West Germany. As our analysis draws on infor-
mation about subjective job loss risk which is only available on an biannual
basis starting in 1999 we can only utilize data for the years 1999, 2001,
2003, 2005 and 2007. Our sample consists of male and female respondents
in prime age (18-64 years). We do not select observations based on labor
market status but rather include dummy variables and interaction terms
for respondents in employment, self-employment, unemployment or out-of
labor force. However, we do exclude a speci¯c type of public o±cials from
the analysis, namely \Beamte" that generally cannot be laid o®.
We further only select individuals for which we have more than one wave
of observation. In addition we had to exclude respondents with missing life
satisfaction information, our dependent variable and missing information
on perceived job insecurity, our main variable of interest. Other than that
we make no exclusion with respect to item non-response and supplement
the analysis with dummy variables for item non-response and recode miss-
ing values to zero. Furthermore, due to our ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation we
only include respondents with a least two completed interviews over the
sample period. This yields an unbalanced sample of 68622 observations
for 18974 individuals.
Table 4 reports respective descriptive statistics for all included vari-
ables. Where relevant, e.g., perceived job insecurity, descriptive statistics
are only reported for the sub-sample of employed respondents.
by Dr. John P. Haisken DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006)for details. The
PanelWhiz generated do-¯le to retrieve the data in the present paper is available from the authors upon request.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































According to Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) applying OLS or ex-
tended conditional logit methods that maintain non-linearity yields similar
estimates as long as unobserved individual heterogeneity is appropriately
accounted for. Accordingly, we re-estimate all speci¯cations relying on
simple linear ¯xed e®ects models to benchmark our ¯ndings from probit-
adapted OLS which had not been discussed in Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Fri-
jters (2004).
Table 5 presents the respective coe±cients. Again, our earlier ¯nding of
a substantial simultaneity bias is con¯rmed. When looking at the pooled
model of males and females the unbiased estimates of perceived job inse-
curity correspond to a compensating income di®erential of 2.5 log points
for somewhat concerned individuals and 8 log points for very concerned
individuals. Thus, they are fairly similar to the estimates from our earlier
probit-adapted linear ¯xed e®ects model.
When calculating the compensating income di®erential of becoming
unemployed we ¯nd it to be 6.38 log points for recent unemployed that were
not concerned about their job security when in employment, 3.9 log points
for the somewhat concerned and -1.6 log points for the very concerned.
Accordingly, our estimates from simple ¯xed e®ects OLS are again close
to the ones from the probit-adapted OLS model.
Summarizing, after controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity
our results derived through probit-adapted OLS as suggested by Van Praag
and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008) are robust to applying simple OLS which also
suggests that using extended conditional logit methods, which, however,
do not easily lend themselves to GMM methods, yields fairly similar results
(see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004).
As a further robustness check we re-estimate our GMM models using
the polynomial \¯rst stage" speci¯cation with 46 excluded instruments.
Again, we ¯nd naively estimated e®ects of job loss concerns to be down-
ward biased in comparison to the GMM results that account for simul-
30Table 5: Regression Results - Simple Linear Fixed E®ects Model
All Male Female
I - FE II - FE GMM III - FE IV - FE GMM V - FE VI - FE GMM
Age : 25 ¡ 34 -0.0283 -0.0416 -0.0416 -0.1015 -0.015 -0.0209
[0.0363] [0.0369] [0.0369] [0.0566]* [0.0484] [0.0488]
Age : 35 ¡ 44 -0.0559 -0.0648 -0.0648 -0.1592 -0.0152 -0.0159
[0.0497] [0.0504] [0.0504] [0.0758]** [0.0676] [0.0680]
Age : 45 ¡ 54 -0.111 -0.1092 -0.1092 -0.2479 -0.0312 -0.025
[0.0616]* [0.0624]* [0.0624]* [0.0924]*** [0.0849] [0.0852]
Age : 55 ¡ 64 -0.1437 -0.1575 -0.1575 -0.2648 -0.0959 -0.0991
[0.0757]* [0.0763]** [0.0763]** [0.1119]** [0.1047] [0.1052]
Number Children £ Male 0.0767 0.0682 0.0682 0.0608
[0.0348]** [0.0352]* [0.0352]* [0.0361]*
Number Children2 £ Male -0.0192 -0.0169 -0.0169 -0.0153
[0.0114]* [0.0116] [0.0116] [0.0117]
Number Children £ Female 0.0796 0.0838 0.0838 0.0745 0.0758
[0.0313]** [0.0315]*** [0.0315]*** [0.0319]** [0.0320]**
Number Children2 £ Female -0.0153 -0.0154 -0.0154 -0.0142 -0.014
[0.0090]* [0.0090]* [0.0090]* [0.0090] [0.0090]
Steady Partner £ Male 0.2506 0.2592 0.2592 0.2602
[0.0457]*** [0.0461]*** [0.0461]*** [0.0472]***
SteadyPartner £ Female 0.3151 0.317 0.317 0.3104 0.311
[0.0425]*** [0.0428]*** [0.0428]*** [0.0427]*** [0.0429]***
ISCED : UNI -0.0011 -0.0287 -0.0287 -0.2417 0.1314 0.1272
[0.0638] [0.0646] [0.0646] [0.0943]** [0.0894] [0.0899]
ISCED : HigherSecondary -0.0423 -0.0455 -0.0455 -0.1606 0.0394 0.0419
[0.0320] [0.0322] [0.0322] [0.0468]*** [0.0447] [0.0448]
ISCED : notreported -0.0068 -0.0099 -0.0099 0.0173 -0.0286 -0.0347
[0.0669] [0.0672] [0.0672] [0.0991] [0.0914] [0.0917]
Number of doctor visits -0.0073 -0.0072 -0.0072 -0.0083 -0.0063 -0.0062
[0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]***
ln(EquivalentIncome) 0.155 0.1494 0.1494 0.1615 0.1482 0.1427
[0.0207]*** [0.0208]*** [0.0208]*** [0.0339]*** [0.0262]*** [0.0263]***
uemp ¤ D :< 2 months -0.6986 -0.9537 -0.9537 -1.2848 -0.4993 -0.6553
[0.0496]*** [0.0715]*** [0.0715]*** [0.1075]*** [0.0692]*** [0.0953]***
uemp ¤ D : 2 ¡ 5 months -0.9139 -1.1778 -1.1778 -1.5516 -0.594 -0.7571
[0.0897]*** [0.1059]*** [0.1059]*** [0.1447]*** [0.1385]*** [0.1577]***
uemp ¤ D : 6 ¡ 12 months -0.832 -1.1101 -1.1101 -1.3707 -0.7008 -0.8659
[0.0811]*** [0.0978]*** [0.0978]*** [0.1368]*** [0.1269]*** [0.1435]***
uemp ¤ D : 12 ¡ 35 months -0.9114 -1.2041 -1.2041 -1.5519 -0.7098 -0.8876
[0.0509]*** [0.0733]*** [0.0733]*** [0.1091]*** [0.0719]*** [0.0993]***
uemp ¤ D :¸ 36 months -0.8862 -1.1969 -1.1969 -1.5888 -0.6518 -0.8436
[0.0759]*** [0.0936]*** [0.0936]*** [0.1368]*** [0.1085]*** [0.1294]***
outlf -0.2998 -0.53 -0.53 -0.7867 -0.2062 -0.3485
[0.0246]*** [0.0542]*** [0.0542]*** [0.0857]*** [0.0311]*** [0.0703]***
semp 0.0625 0.045 0.045 0.0015 0.0774 0.0703
[0.0460] [0.0459] [0.0459] [0.0639] [0.0653] [0.0658]
regional unemployment -0.0045 -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0061 -0.008 -0.0067
[0.0059] [0.0060] [0.0060] [0.0090] [0.0080] [0.0080]
F : somewhat concerned -0.1612 -0.3729 -0.3729 -0.4554 -0.1365 -0.2633
[0.0180]*** [0.1164]*** [0.1164]*** [0.1753]*** [0.0273]*** [0.1541]*
F : very concerned -0.4695 -1.19 -1.19 -1.502 -0.4137 -0.9175
[0.0282]*** [0.0846]*** [0.0846]*** [0.1175]*** [0.0421]*** [0.1229]***
Observations 68622 68622 68622 32623 35999 35999
R2 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.97
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * - statistically signi¯cant at 1, 5, 10%.
All speci¯cations contain a full set of year dummies and are within transformed.
Default categories: Age : 18 ¡ 24, ISCED : Lower Secondary or less, emp, F : not concerned
taneity. We calculate a compensating income di®erential of 3.3 log points
for respondents who report to be somewhat concerned about their job
security and 7.6 log points for very concerned individuals (see Table 6).
31Thus, based on these estimates we can conclude that the size of the simul-
taneity bias is only slightly smaller when applying this alternative model
speci¯cation instead of the preferred one reported in Table 3.
32Table 6: Regression Results - Probit Adapted Linear Fixed E®ects GMM Model -
Full Polynomial in \First Stage"
All Male Female
I - FE GMM II - FE GMM III - FE GMM
Age : 25 ¡ 34 -0.0182 -0.0546 -0.0004
[0.0206] [0.0313]* [0.0275]
Age : 35 ¡ 44 -0.0278 -0.0827 0.0033
[0.0279] [0.0414]** [0.0378]
Age : 45 ¡ 54 -0.0481 -0.1292 -0.0008
[0.0341] [0.0502]** [0.0468]
Age : 55 ¡ 64 -0.0711 -0.1312 -0.0451
[0.0416]* [0.0608]** [0.0573]
Number Children £ Male 0.0284 0.0231
[0.0185] [0.0189]
Number Children2 £ Male -0.0089 -0.0081
[0.0058] [0.0059]
Number Children £ Female 0.0408 0.0379
[0.0176]** [0.0177]**
Number Children2 £ Female -0.0077 -0.0074
[0.0051] [0.0051]
Steady Partner £ Male 0.1409 0.1444
[0.0248]*** [0.0252]***
SteadyPartner £ Female 0.1736 0.1629
[0.0227]*** [0.0220]***
ISCED : UNI 0.0074 -0.1089 0.0904
[0.0371] [0.0543]** [0.0511]*
ISCED : HigherSecondary -0.0333 -0.1015 0.0147
[0.0181]* [0.0263]*** [0.0244]
ISCED : notreported -0.0185 -0.004 -0.0321
[0.0372] [0.0550] [0.0504]
Number of doctor visits -0.0036 -0.0042 -0.0032
[0.0003]*** [0.0004]*** [0.0004]***
ln(EquivalentIncome) 0.0754 0.0812 0.0736
[0.0113]*** [0.0178]*** [0.0144]***
uemp ¤ D :< 2 months -0.4902 -0.6456 -0.3544
[0.0316]*** [0.0468]*** [0.0435]***
uemp ¤ D : 2 ¡ 5 months -0.5995 -0.7579 -0.4252
[0.0492]*** [0.0646]*** [0.0772]***
uemp ¤ D : 6 ¡ 12 months -0.5633 -0.6812 -0.4562
[0.0460]*** [0.0631]*** [0.0689]***
uemp ¤ D : 12 ¡ 35 months -0.6092 -0.7632 -0.4764
[0.0323]*** [0.0475]*** [0.0450]***
uemp ¤ D :¸ 36 months -0.5727 -0.7587 -0.4086
[0.0418]*** [0.0604]*** [0.0592]***
outlf -0.2754 -0.3845 -0.2053
[0.0221]*** [0.0354]*** [0.0295]***
semp 0.0241 0.0046 0.0318
[0.0247] [0.0337] [0.0360]
regional unemployment -0.0035 -0.0017 -0.0051
[0.0031] [0.0046] [0.0043]
F : somewhat concerned -0.25 -0.2445 -0.2621
[0.0388]*** [0.0565]*** [0.0523]***
F : very concerned -0.5709 -0.7608 -0.3807
[0.0383]*** [0.0535]*** [0.0544]***
Observations 68622 32623 35999
R2 0.96 0.97 0.97
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * - statistically signi¯cant at 1, 5, 10%.
All speci¯cations contain a full set of year dummies and are within transformed.
Default categories: Age : 18 ¡ 24, ISCED : Lower Secondary or less, emp, F : not concerned
33